Introduction
There are a lot of data of the processes of prices of huge variety of contingent claims, vanilla options, exotic options, etc. Each process corresponds the price of a specific contingent claim issued in a specific market and offered by a specific financial institution. A typical example is the call and put options with a specific stock price as their underlying asset. We can find the real time data of of the option price C t , t ≥ t 0 for a call option C T = (S T − k) + with T as its maturity. There exist many processes of prices of this specific product, e.g., the bid price, the ask price, the we-buy price and we-sell price by a market maker under a specific background, etc. The main point of view of this paper is, behind a price process, there is a pricing mechanism. Take the above option market price C t for example, there exists a mapping E t,T [·] from Λ T the space of option price states at time T to Λ t at the time t ∈ [t 0 , T ] such that C t is produced by E t,T [C T ]. This family of mapping E t,T [X] : X ∈ Λ T −→ Λ t , t ≤ T forms the pricing mechanism for this specific option market prices.
Black-Scholes formula can be regarded as a dynamic pricing mechanism of contingent claim. In fact, it can be regarded as to solve a specific linear backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE). More generally, each BSDE with a given generating function g forms a dynamic model of pricing mechanism of contingent claims.
In this paper we explain the following result: if an a dynamic pricing mechanism is dominated by g µ -pricing mechanism, with large enough µ > 0, then it is a g-pricing mechanism: there exists a unique generating function g, such that the price of the pricing mechanism is solved by the corresponding BSDE. In this case, to find the corresponding generating function g by using data of the pricing process is a very interesting problem, since g determines entirely the pricing mechanism. The domination condition can be tested also by data analysis of the price processes.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present the the notion of F t -consistent pricing mechanisms in subsection 2.1. We then give a concrete F tpricing mechanism: E g -pricing mechanisms in subsection 2.2. The main result, Theorem 3.1, will be presented in section 3. We also provide some examples and explain how to find the function g through by testing the input-output data. This main theorem will be proved in Section 9. Nonlinear decomposition theorems of Doob-Meyer's type, i.e., Proposition 4.13 and Theorem 8.1 play crucial roles in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Theorem 8.1 has also an interesting interpretation in finance (see Remark 8.2) .
The crucial domination inequality (3.1) of our main result Theorem 3.1 is tested by using data of parameter files, provided by CME, for options based on S&P500 futures. The result strongly support that the option pricing mechanism of CME is a g-pricing mechanism.
Another application of the dynamical expectations and pricing mechanisms is to risk measures. Axiomatic conditions for a (one step) coherent risk measure was introduced by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath 1999 [2] and, for a convex risk measure, by Föllmer and Schied (2002) [26] . Rosazza Gianin (2003) studied dynamical risk measures using the notion of g-expectations in [45] (see also [41] , [3] , [4] ) in which (B1)-(B4) are satisfied. In fact conditions (A1)-(A4), as well as their special situation (B1)-(B4) provides an ideal characterization of the dynamical behaviors of a the a risk measure. But in this paper we emphasis the study of the mechanism of the pricing mechanism to a further payoff, for which is, in general, the translation property in risk measure is not satisfied.
2 The pricing mechanisms and g-pricing mechanism by BSDE
Basic setting
We assume that the price S of the underlying assets is driven by a d-dimensional Brownian motion (B t ) t≥0 in a probability space (Ω, F , P ). We don't need to precise the model of S t , what we assume here is that the information F S t of the price S coincides with that of the Brownian motion:
For each t ∈ [0, ∞), the state of contingent prices will be given in the following space
:={the space of all real valued F t -measurable random variables such that E[|X| p ] < ∞}.
Definition 2.1 A system of operators:
is called an F t -consistent pricing mechanism defined on [T 0 , T 1 ] if it satisfies the following properties: for each T 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T 1 and for each
We will often consider (A1)-(A4) plus an additional condition:
Remark 2.2
The raison we use the letter E s,t [·] to denote the above pricing mechanism is that its behavior is very like the conditional expectation E[X t |F s ] for a F t -measurable random variable. It is wise profit this similarity to introduce the notion of E-martingales which are the data of the processes of option prices produced by this pricing mechanism. Remark 2.3 (A1) and (A2) are economically obvious conditions. Condition (A3) means that the value E s,t [X t ] can be regarded as a contingent claim at the maturity s. The price of this contingent claim at the time r ≤ s is E r,s [E s,t [X t ]]. It have to be the same as the price E r,t [X t ].
Remark 2.4
The meaning of condition (A4) is: at time s, the agent knows whether I A worthes 1. If it is 1, then the price E s,t [1 A X t ] must be the same as
Proof. . It is clear that (A4') implies (A4). E s,t [0] ≡ 0 can be derived by putting A = ∅ in (A4'). On the other hand, (A4) plus the additional condition implies
We thus have
It is simply because of
Remark 2.7 At time t, the agent knows the value of 1 A . (A4) means that, if, ω ∈ A, i.e.., 1 A (ω) = 1 then the value E s,t [1 A X] should be the same as E s,t [X] since the two outcomes X(ω) and (1 A X)(ω) are exactly the same. (A4) is applied to the pricing mechanism of a final outcome X plus some "dividend"
An immediate property of this dynamical pricing mechanism is that they can be pasted together, one after the other to form a new dynamical pricing mechanism:
Proof. It suffices to prove the case N = 2, since we then can apply this result to the cases [T 0 ,
We define
Dynamic pricing mechanism generated by BSDE
We need the following notations. Let p ≥ 1 and t ∈ [0, ∞) be given.
•
={R m -valued and predictable stochastic processes such that
In the case m = 1, we denote them by 4) where the unknown is the pair of the adapted processes (Y, Z). Here the function g is given
It satisfies the following basic assumptions for each ∀y,
In some cases it is interesting to consider the following situation:
Obviously (b) implies (a). This BSDE (2.4) was intrduced by Bismut [5] , [6] for the case where g is a linear function of (y, z). Pardoux and Peng [33] obtained the following result (see Theorem 4.3 for a more general situation): for each
We thus define a system of operators
Proposition 2.10 Let the generating function g satisfies (2.5). Then
is an F t -consistent pricing mechanism, called g-pricing mechanism, i.e., it satisfies (A1)-(A4) of Definition 2.1.
This pricing mechanism is entirely generated by function g. We then call g a (contingent claim) price generating function. Proof. This result is a special case of Proposition 4.9.
Since g satisfies Lipschitz condition with Lipschitz constant µ, it is then dominated by the following function
in the following since
We will see that the above notion of domination is useful. Briefly speaking, a price generating function g is dominated by another one if and only if the corresponding pricing mechanism E g is dominated by the other one.
Main result: E s,t [·] is governed by a BSDE
From now on the system E s,t [·] 0≤s≤t<∞ is always a fixed F t -consistent pricing mechanism, i.e., satisfying (A1)-(A4), with additional assumptions (A4 0 ) and the following E gµ -domination assumption:
(A5) there exists a sufficiently large number µ > 0 such that, for each 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ,
where the function g µ (y, z) = µ|y| + µ|z| is given in (2.8).
The main theorem of this paper is:
We assume that the function g satisfies (2.5) with g(·, 0, 0) = 0.
is an F t -consistent pricing mechanism satisfying (A1)-(A4), (A4 0 ) and the domination condition (A5). E g is then called g-(contingent claim) pricing mechanism, and the function g is called a (contingent claim) price generating function. Conversely, let E s,t [·] 0≤s≤t<∞ be an F t -consistent pricing mechanism satisfying (A1)-(A4), (A4 0 ) and the domination condition (A5), then there exists a unique price generating function g(ω, t, y, z) satisfying (2.5) with g(·, 0, 0) ≡ 0, such that We consider some special situations of our theorem.
Example 3.3 If moreover, g(s, y, 0) ≡ 0. Then, by [36] , (A2') holds. Thus, according to Proposition 2.5,
. This is so called g-expectation introduced in [36] .
This extends non trivially the result obtained in [11] , (see also [41] for a more systematical presentation and explanations in finance), where we needed a more strict domination condition plus the following assumption
Under these assumptions we have proved in [11] that there exists a unique
Example 3.4 Consider a financial market consisting of d + 1 assets: one bond and d stocks. We denote by P 0 (t) the price of the bond and by P i (t) the price of the i-th stock at time t. We assume that P 0 is the solution of the ordinary differential equation: dP 0 (t) = r(t)P 0 (t)dt, and
is the solution of the following SDE
Here r is the interest rate of the bond;
is the rate of the expected return, {σ ij } d i,j=1 the volatility of the stocks. We assume that r, b, σ and σ −1 are all F t -adapted and uniformly bounded processes on [0, ∞). Black and Scholes have solved the problem of the market pricing mechanism of an European type of derivative X ∈ L 2 (F T ) with maturity T . In the point of view of BSDE, the problem can be treated as follows: consider an investor who has, at a time t ≤ T , n 0 (t) bonds and n i (t) i-stocks, i = 1, · · · , d, i.e., he invests n 0 (t)P 0 (t) in bond and
square-integrable and adapted process. We define by y(t) the investor's wealth invested in the market at time t:
We make the so called self-financing assumption: in the period [0, T ], the investor does not withdraw his money from, or put his money in his account y t . Under this condition, his wealth y(t) evolves according to
We denote g(t, y, z) :
We observe that function g satisfies (2.5). It follows from the existence and uniqueness theorem of BSDE (Theorem 4.
) with the terminal condition y T = X. This meaning is significant: in order to replicate the derivative X, the investor needs and only needs to invest y(t) at the present time t and then, during the time interval [t, T ] and then to perform the portfolio strategy
Furthermore, by Comparison Theorem of BSDE, if he wants to replicate a X ′ which is bigger than X, (i.e., X ′ ≥ X, a.s., P (X ′ ≥ X) > 0), then he must pay more, i.e., there this no arbitrage opportunity. This y(t) is called the Black-Scholes price, or Black-Scholes pricing mechanism, of X at the time t. We define, as in (4.6), E Example 3.5 An very important problem is: if we know that the pricing mechanism of an investigated agent is a g-pricing mechanism E g , how to find this price generating function g. We now consider a case where g depends only on z, i.e., g = g(z) : R d → R. In this case we can find such g by the following testing method. Letz ∈ R d be given. We denote
, where t is the present time. It is the solution of the following BSDE
It is seen that the solution is
Thus the function g can be tested as follows: at the present time t, we ask the investigated agent to evaluatez(B T − B t ). We thus get
Remark 3.6 The above test works also for the case g : [0, ∞) × R d → R, or for a more general situation g = γy + g 0 (t, z).
An interesting problem is, in general, how to find the price generating function g by a testing of the input-output behavior of
The following result was obtained in Proposition 2.3 of [7] .
Proposition 3.7 We assume that the price generating function g satisfies (2.5).
We also assume that, for each fixed
4 Pricing an accumulated contingent claim with E g -pricing mechanisms
F (0, T ) with maturity T is a contract, according which the writer have to pay the buyer X at T and. in each time interval
Remark 4.2
We understand that, in a real life, X should be non negative and K non decreasing. But we will see that we can treat the general situation
We consider the following BSDE on [0, t] with given terminal condition X ∈ L 2 (F t ) and an RCLL process K ∈ D 2 F (0, ∞):
When K is an increasing (resp. decreasing) process, the solution (Y, Z) is called a g-supersolution (resp. g-subsolution). These type of solutuions appear very often in superhedging problem in the pricing of contingent claims in an incomplete markets, where one need to find the smallest g-supersolutuion (resp. the largest g-subsolution) to replicate X. We first recall the following basic results of BSDE. 
We have
Proof. In [33] (see also [24] ), the result of BSDE is for t = T and
The present situation can be treated by setting (see [36] 
and considering the following equivalent BSDĒ
Sinceḡ is a Lipschitz function with the same Lipschitz constant µand [33] , [35] , the BSDE (4.4) has a unique solution (Ȳ , Z).
We introduce a new notation. 
We will prove it for a more general price mechanism E[·], see the next subsection.
Remark 4.6 About the notations
. This notation was firstly introduced in [36] in the case where g satisfies (2.6)-(b). In this situation it is easy to check that
In other words, E
g -is a nonlinear expectation, called g-expectation. The general situation, i.e., without (2.6) was introduced in [35] and [16] .
By the above existence and uniqueness theorem, we have for each 0 ≤ r ≤ s ≤ t and for each X ∈ L 2 (F t ) and
It is also easy to check that, with the notation g − (t, y, z) := −g(t, −y, −z)
We will see that {E
form an F t -consistent nonlinear pricing mechanism. The following monotonicity property is the comparison theorem of BSDE. Theorem 4.7 We assume (2.5). For each fixed maturity let for let (X, K) and
F (0, T ) be two accumulated contingent claims satisfying X ≥ X ′ and that K − K ′ is an increasing process. Then we have
Proof. The case K t ≡ K ′ t ≡ 0 is the classical comparison theorem of BSDE. The present general situation, see [35] or [41] .
We recall the special price generating function g µ (y, z) defined in (2.8). It is a very strong generating function. In fact we have Corollary 4.8 The g-pricing mechanism E g is dominated by E gµ in the following sense: for each t ≥ 0, let (X, K) and
F (0, T ) be two accumulated contingent claims with maturity t, then we have
where µ is the Lipschitz constant of g given in (2.5). In particular, since g µ the generating function g µ itself has Lipschitz constant µ, we have
Proof. By the definition, The pricing processes produces by 
We compare it to the BSDĒ 
defined in (4.5) is an F t -consistent pricing mechanism, i.e., it satisfies (A1)-(A4) of Definition 2.1.
Proof. (A1) is given by (4.9). (A2) is clearly true by the definition. (A3) is proved by (4.7)
. We now consider (A4), i.e., for each t and X ∈ L 2 (F t ), we have
as well as
where we set
We will give the proof of (4.15). 
We multiply 1 A , A ∈ F s on both sides of the above two BSDEs. 
If Y is the data of a price process produced by some contingent claim pricing mechanism, in many situations it is practically meaningful and financially interesting to compare this data by using a given g-pricing mechanism. One typical situation is that the price produced by E g is weaker (resp. stronger). In this situation Y is called a g-supermartingale (resp. g-submartingale). Here the term "g-martingale" is a nonlinear, and nontrivial generalization of the classical one, due to the similarity between the classical conditional expectation E
Clearly a E g -martingale Y is a price process produced by this pricing mechanism:
It is clear that (−y, −z) solves
, where we denote g * (t, y, z) := −g(t, −y, −z).
Therefor many results concerning E g [·; K]-supermartingales can be also applied to situations of submartingales.
F (0, T ) be given such that A is an increasing process. By the monotonicity of E g , i.e., Theorem 4.7, we have, for
As in classical situations, an interesting and hard problem is the inverse one: if Y is an E g -supermartingale, can we find an increasing and predictable process A such that Y t ≡ E g t,T [X; A]? This nonlinear version of Doob-Meyer's decomposition theorem will be stated as follows. It plays a crucially important role in this paper.
We have the following E g -supermartingale decomposition theorem of DoobMeyer's type. This nonlinear decomposition theorem was obtained in [38] . But the formulation using the notation E g t,T [·; A] is new. In fact we think this is the intrinsic formulation since it becomes necessary in the more abstract situation of the E-supermartingale decomposition theorem, i.e., Theorem 8.1 which can considered as a generalization of the following result.
Proposition 4.13 We assume (2.5)-(i) and (ii). Let
Then there exists a unique increasing process A ∈ D 2 F (0, T ) (thus predictable) with A 0 = 0, such that
(4.20)
Then there exists a unique increasing process
Proof. By the notations of (4.3) with t = T , we have
It follows that (4.21) is equivalent to
In other words, Y + K is an Eḡ-supermartingale in the sense of (4.19). By the above supermartingale decomposition theorem, Proposition 4.13, there exists an increasing process A ∈ D 2 F (0, T ) with A 0 = 0, such that 25) or, equivalently (4.22).
Characterization of g-pricing mechanism by its generating function g
For a price mechanism E g [·], it is important to distinct her selling price and buying price. We now fix that E g [·] is the selling price. A rational price mechanism must be
It also possesses some other properties, such as convexity, or moreover, subadditivity. See [2] , [3] , [4] , [9] , [23] , [24] , [26] , [28] , [37] , [45] , etc. for the ecomomic meanings. An interesting question is: what the corresponding generating function g will behaves if the the E g satisfies the above properties. We will see that g perfectly reflects the behavior of E g . This will be very important for using data of the pricing processes to statistically find g. We begin with introducing some technique lemmas.
Let a functions f : (ω, t, y, z) ∈ Ω × [0, T ] × R × R d → R satisfy the same Lipschitz condition (2.5) as for g. For each n = 1, 2, 3, · · · , we set
It is clear that f n is an F t -adapted process. For each fixed (t, y, z) 
We have the following classical result of Itô's SDE. |f (·, 0, 0)| 2 ds. We then have 
Proof. Let us fix y and z. We define f n (s, y, z) as in (5.1). It is clear that,
We thus have 5.6.
We need the following inverse comparison theorem which generalizes the results of [7] and [10] in the sense that g does not need to be continuous, or right continuous, in time. We thus finally obtain an equivalent conditions under the standard condition (2.5) of BSDE. We notice that this result was obtained by already by [30] and [31] . Here we will use a very different method that will be applied in the proof of our main theorem.
d → R be two price generating functions satisfying (2.5). Then the following two conditions are equivalent:
Proof. The method of the proof is significantly different from [7] and [10] . The part (i)⇒(ii) is simply from the standard comparison theorem of BSDE. We now prove the part (ii)⇒(i). For each fixed (t, y, z) 
Proof. We denoteḡ(t, y, z) := −g(t, −y, −z) and compare the following two BSDE:
By the above Proposition, one has
Proposition 5.6 The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) The price generating function g = g(t, y, z) is convex (resp. concave) in (y, z), i.e., for each (y, z) and (y
(ii) The corresponding pricing mechanism E g s,t [·] is a convex (resp. concave), i.e., for each fixed α ∈ [0, 1], we have
Proof. We only prove the convex case. 
We set Y s := αY t,y,z s
Thus the process Y is a g-supermartingale defined on [t, T ]. It follows from the decomposition theorem, i.e., Theorem 4.13, that, there exists an increasing
We compare this with
It follows that
Thus we have g(s, αY t,y,z s
We then can apply Lemma 5.3 to obtain (i).
Proposition 5.7
The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) The price generating function g is positively homogenous in (y, z) ∈ R × R d , i.e., g(t, λy, λz) = λg(t, y, z), a.e., a,s,, 
Proposition 5.9 The price generating function g is independent of y if and only if, the corresponding g-pricing mechanism is cash invariant, namely, for
Proof. We first prove the "If" part. For each fixed (y, We then can apply Lemma 5.3 to obtain that, for each (y, z) ∈ R × R d , g(r, y, z) ≡ g(r, y − y, z) ≡ g(r, 0, z).
Namely, g is independent of y. "Only if part": For each for each
.
The proof is complete.
We consider the following self-financing condition:
satisfies the self-financing condition if and only if its price generating function g satisfies g(t, 0, 0) = 0, a.e., a.s.
Proof. The "if" part is obvious. The "only if part":
Thus Z s ≡ 0 and then g(s, 0, Z s ) = g(s, 0, 0) ≡ 0.
Zero-interesting rate condition:
satisfies the zero-interesting rate condition if and only if its price generating function g satisfies, for each y ∈ R, g(·, y, 0) = 0.
Proof.
For a fixed y ∈ R, we consider Y s := E g s,T [y] ≡ y. Let Z s be the corresponding Itô's integrand 
But this is equivalent to
we have ) s≥t be the solution of (5.3). We have,
From which we deduce Z s =z :
It then follows from Lemma 5.3 that g(t, y,z) = g(t, y, z), t ≥ 0, a.e., a.s.,
i.e., g does not depend the i 0 th component of z ∈ R d .
Proposition 5.13
The following condition are equivalent:
(ii) The corresponding pricing generating function g is a deterministic function of (t, y, z)
The proof is similar as the others. We omit it.
6 Pricing accumulated contingent claim by a gen-
For a given K ∈ D 2 F (0, ∞), we will find the corresponding definition E s,t [·; K], for an abstract dynamic pricing mechanism E s,t [·] defined on [0, ∞). To this end we first consider the case K ∈ D 0 F (0, ∞), the space of step processes defined by
) (t) be fixed. We observe that, for each T > 0 and X ∈ L 2 (F T ), (X, K) is an accumulated contingent claim with maturity T in a simple way that, at each time t i ≤ T , the buyer of the contract (X, K) receives K ti − K ti− , and, in addition, she or he receives X at the maturity T .
We define, for each 0
Proof. It is easy to check that (A1), (A2) and (A3) holds. We now prove (A4), i.e., for each t i ≤ s ≤ t ≤ t i+1 and X ∈ L 2 (F t ),
We have 
Remark 6.3 It is easy to check that, for each accumulated contingent claim (X, K) with maturity t and K ∈ D 0 F (0, t), the only consistent price of (X, K) of the pricing mechanism E is E s,t [X; K] 0≤s≤t . Proposition 6. 4 We assume that E s,t [·] 0≤s≤t<∞ is a given pricing mechanism satisfying (A1)-(A5) and (A4 0 ). Then for each K ∈ D 2 F (0, ∞) there exists a pricing mechanism E s,t [·; K] 0≤s≤t<∞ which is dominated by E gµ in the following sense, for each
Such pricing mechanism is uniquely defined. Furthermore, under the pricing mechanism E the price process of the accumulated contingent claim (X, K) with maturity t is E s,t [X;
The prove of this proposition can be found in [43] .
E[·; K]-martingales
Hereinafter, E s,t [·] will be a fixed F t -consistent pricing mechanism satisfying (A1)-(A5) and (A4 0 ). Similar to E g s,t [·]-pricing mechanism, we introduce the notion of E[·; K]-martingale:
We then can apply E g -supermartingale decomposition theorem, i.e., Proposition 4.13, to get the following result.
Proposition 7.2 We assume (A1)-(A5) and (A4
, has the following expression: there exist processes (g
) be the corresponding expression in (7.2), then we have 
It then follows that Z t,X,K s
Thus dA + and dA − are absolutely continuous with respect to ds. We denote a
We then can rewrite (7.6) as It remains to prove (7.4) . By (A5) of Proposition 4.
Thus we can repeat the above procedure to prove that there exist processes
, we immediately havê
This with (7.11) yields (7.4). The proof is complete. 8 E-supermartingale decomposition theorem: intrinsic formulation
Our objective of this section is to give the following E-supermartingale decomposition theorem of Doob-Meyer's type. Since (E s,t [·]) s≤t is abstract and nonlinear, it is necessary to introduce the intrinsic form (8.1). This theorem plays an important role in the proof of the main theorem of this paper. It can be also considered as a generalization of Proposition 4.13. This is a very profond theorem, the proof can be found in [43, Peng 2005 ]. In the above inequalities the left hand are market data taken from CME parameter files. The right hand are the corresponding g µ -expectations. We have calculated all these values by using standard binomial tree algorithm of BSDE. Here use the algorithms in Peng and Xu [2005] to solve the following 1-dimensional BSDE:
